

Assured Identity for Enterprise Level Security

William R. Simpson and Kevin E. Foltz

Abstract — Increasing threat intrusions to enterprise computing systems have led to a formulation of guarded enterprise systems. The approach was to put in place steel gates and prevent hostile entities from entering the enterprise domain. The current complexity level has made the fortress approach to security implemented throughout the defense, banking, and other high-trust industries unworkable. The alternative security approach, called Enterprise Level Security (ELS), is the result of a concentrated 14-year program of pilots and research. The primary identity credential for ELS is the PKI certificate, issued to the individual who is provided with a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card with a hardware chip for storing the private key. All sessions are preceded by a PKI mutual authentication, and a TLS 1.2 communication pipeline is established. This process was deemed to provide a high enough identity assurance to proceed. However, in some instances the PIV card is not available and a compatible approach is needed. This paper discusses a multi-level authentication approach designed to satisfy the level of identity assurance specified by the data owner and to be compatible with the ELS approach for security.

Index Terms — Identity, Authentication, Multi-Factor Authentication, Enterprise Level Security

I. INTRODUCTION

Adversaries continue to penetrate, and in many cases, already exist within, our network perimeter, i.e., they have infiltrated the online environment, jeopardizing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of enterprise information and systems. The fortress model – hard on the outside, soft on the inside – assumes that the boundary can prevent all types of penetration [8], but this assumption has been proven wrong by a multitude of reported network-related incidents. The previous statements are no longer controversial but a wise assumption for data and information security practitioners. Network attacks are pervasive, and nefarious code is present even in the face of system sweeps to discover and clean readily apparent malware. The focus of this paper is on the security aspects of countering existing known and unknown threats based on robust identity and access management (IdAM) and on how this access control system can dynamically support mission information requirements. A working prototype has been developed and evaluated for security, functionality, and scaling issues. Due to space constraints, multi-level security issues are not addressed in this paper.

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Enterprise Level Security (ELS) is a capability designed to counter adversarial threats by protecting applications and data with a dynamic claims-based access control (CBAC) solution. ELS helps provide a high-assurance environment in which information can be generated, exchanged, processed, and used. It is important to note that the ELS design is based on a set of high-level tenets that are the overarching guidance for every decision made, from protocol selection to product configuration and use [7]. From there, a set of enterprise-level requirements are formulated that conforms to the tenets and any high-level guidance, policies, and requirements.

The basic tenets, used at the outset of the ELS security model, are the following:

0. Malicious entities are present.
1. Simplicity.
2. Extensibility.
3. Information hiding.
4. Accountability.
5. Specify Minimal detail.
6. Service-driven rather than a product-driven solution.
7. Lines of authority should be preserved.
8. Need-to-share as overriding need-to-know.
9. Separation of function.
10. Reliability.
11. Trust but verify (and validate).
12. Minimum attack surface.
13. Handle exceptions and errors.
14. Use proven solutions.
15. Do not repeat old mistakes.

The current paper-laden access control processes for an enterprise operation are plagued with ineffectiveness and inefficiencies. In a number of enterprises, tens of thousands of personnel transfer locations and duties annually, which on a daily basis introduces delays and security vulnerabilities into their operations. ELS mitigates security risks while eliminating much of the system administration required to manually grant and remove user/group permissions to specific applications/systems. Early calculations show that for government and defense, 90–95% of recurring man-hours will be saved and up to 3 weeks in delay for access request processing will be eliminated by ELS-enabled applications [11]. While a perimeter-based architecture assumes that threats are stopped at the front gates, ELS does not accept this precondition and is designed to mitigate many of the primary vulnerability points at the application using a distributed security architecture, shown in Figure 1.

II. ENTERPRISE LEVEL SECURITY

The ELS design addresses five security principles that are derived from the basic tenets:

- Know the Players – this is done by enforcing bi-lateral end-to-end authentication;
- Maintain Confidentiality – this entails end-to-end unbroken encryption (no in-transit decryption/payload inspection);
- Separate Access and Privilege from Identity – this is done by an authorization credential;
- Maintain Integrity – know that you received exactly what was sent;
- Require Explicit Accountability – monitor and log transactions.





Figure 1: Distributed Security Architecture

A. Know the Players

In ELS, the identity certificate is an X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate [1]. This identity is required for all active entities, both person and non-person, e.g., services, as shown in Figure 2. PKI certificates are verified and validated. Ownership is verified by a holder-of-key check. Supplemental (in combination with PKI) authentication factors may be required from certain entities, such as identity confirming information or biometric data.



Active Entity may be: User, Web Application, Web Service, Aggregation Service, Exposure Service, Token Server, or any element that can be a requester or provider.

Figure 2: Bi-lateral Authentication

B. Maintain Confidentiality

Figure 3 shows that ELS establishes end-to-end Transport Layer Security (TLS) [2] encryption (and never gives away private keys that belong uniquely to the certificate holder).




Figure 3: End-to-End Encryption

C. Separate Access and Privilege from Identity

ELS can accommodate changes in location, assignment, and other attributes by separating the use of associated attributes from the identity. Whenever changes to attributes occur, claims are recomputed based on new associated attributes (see section III), allowing immediate access to required mission information. As shown in Figure 4, access control credentials use the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (SAML authorization tokens differ from the more commonly used single-sign-on (SSO) tokens, which in ELS are not used for authentication.) [3]. SAML

tokens are signed and the signatures are verified and validated before acceptance. The credentials of the signers also are verified and validated. The credential for access and privilege is bound to the requester by ensuring a match of the distinguished name used in both the authentication and the authorization credentials.




Figure 4: Claims-Based Authorization

D. Maintain Integrity

Integrity is implemented at the connection layer by end-to-end TLS message authentication codes (MACs), see Figure 5. Chained integrity, by which trust is passed on transitively from one entity to another, is not used since it is not as strong as end-to-end integrity. At the application layer, packages (SAML tokens, etc.) are signed, and signatures are verified and validated [4].




Figure 5: Integrity Measures

E. Require Explicit Accountability




Figure 6: Accountability through Centralized Monitoring

All active entities with ELS are required to act on their own behalf (no proxies or impersonation allowed). As shown in Figure 6, ELS monitors specified activities for accountability and forensics. The monitor files are formatted in a standard way and stored locally. For enterprise files, a monitor sweep agent reads, translates, cleans, and submits to an enterprise relational database for recording log records periodically or on-demand. Local files

are cleaned periodically to reduce overall storage and to provide a centralized repository for help desk, forensics, and other activities. The details of this activity are provided in designated technical profiles and [5, 6].

In summary, by abiding with the tenets and principles discussed above, ELS allows users access without accounts by computing targeted claims for enterprise applications (using enterprise attribute stores and asset-owner-defined claims for access and privilege). ELS has been shown to be a viable, scalable alternative to current access control schemas [11]. A complete description of ELS basics is provided in [12].

III. IDENTITY ISSUES

Identity in the enterprise is a unique representation of an entity. For users, it begins with the human resources who maintain their files. The assigned identity is called the Distinguished Name (DN) and it must be unique over space and time. There may be five John Smiths in the enterprise, but only one John.Smith2534, UID=Finance, HID=Chicago. These and PKI information are normally encoded into a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card for network access and provided to the entity for its use. Certain pieces of the information may be tagged as verifiable by DN for identity purposes, such as wife’s middle name.

There is a need to allow users without PIVs some degree of access based on alternative authentication methods. PIVs may not be available to all, but also, the user device may not be capable of reading and using a PIV. Additional use cases include lost PIV, waiting for issuance of a PIV, or a user being unable to get a PIV compatible with the ELS certificate authority trust. Additionally, there are federation partners, contractors, and other vetted external individuals with short-term needs.

Each application ultimately decides what kind of authentication is strong enough (through a registration process with Enterprise Attribute Ecosystem (EAE)).

The creation of a non-PIV identity comprises three separate stages. The first stage is creation of a *proposed identity*. This value is provided by the user. The goal is to correlate this with the enterprise files. It may be an email, a common name, or simply a name. The second stage is creation of a *candidate identity* (starting point for identity determination), in which the *proposed identity* is paired with an enterprise identity, and a DN is determined. As we will discuss, the process also takes steps to verify that the pairing between the *proposed identity* and the DN is owned by the individual making the request. The last stage is creation of the *assured identity*. The *candidate identity* becomes the *assured identity* when enough correlated information and personal verification about the *candidate identity* has a sufficient level of pairing with the enterprise identity that it can be trusted with access to an application using his/her claims that have been computed for his/her use.

IV. SCALE OF IDENTITY ASSURANCE

If you search the literature for multi-factor authentication, you will find a predominance of processes based upon account-based systems and starting with username–password [13-21]. These systems intertwine the security issues of authentication and authorization. In fact, the popular definition of multi-factor authentication merges the two:

“Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a method of computer access control in which a user is only granted access after successfully presenting several separate pieces of evidence to an authentication mechanism – typically at

least two of the following categories: knowledge (something they know); possession (something they have), and inherence (something they are).” [22]

ELS separates the identity and access/privilege security issues. Thus there are no accounts and no usernames with passwords. Further, ELS uses no proxies and limits access to the enterprise attribute system, thus reducing the threat surface.

Each data owner will decide what the requirements for access and privilege to their data are, and this includes the level of assurance that is acceptable. ELS represents a strong identity assurance and will be assigned a value of .80 (values are arbitrary and subject to revision). It is assumed that if the data owner wishes strong identity assurance he will specify .70 or .75 as the identity assurance value (from the collection below, the value of .75 requires bio information in the absence of PIV). This will allow all enterprise users with a PIV to actually present access and privilege claims to the application. The lowest level of identity assurance would come from self-assertion; however, we will require several additional factors for this minimum, including a presence in the enterprise catalog, verification by an out-of-band (OOB – phone or e-mail) method; and of course for authorization, claims must be available for the individual. This lowest level will be described as User Asserted Identity with OOB verification and assigned a value of .2, which should also be the minimum specified by a data owner. A total of seven identity cases were developed, as follows, with strengths shown in Table 1:

1. Bi-lateral AUTHN (Hard Token) – **AUTHN Hard**
 2. Bi-lateral AUTHN (prior issued Soft Token) in protected store. – **ATHN Soft**
 3. User Asserted Identity with Out-of-Band (OOB) verification – **OOB**
 4. User Asserted Identity with OOB verification and with any Biometric factor – **OOB Bio**
 5. User Asserted Identity with OOB verification and with any Biometric factor and with any non-biometric multi-factor verification – **OOB Bio + 1mf.**
 6. User Asserted Identity with OOB verification and with any non-biometric multi-factor verification – **OOB + 1mf**
 7. User Asserted Identity with OOB verification and with three non-biometric multi-factor verifications – **OOB + 3mf**
- Enhanced Identity Assurance:
8. Hard token plus one non-biometric multi-factor verification – **Hard token + 1mf**
 9. Hard token plus one biometrics authentication. – **Hard token + 1bio**
 10. Hard token plus one biometric and one non-biometric multifactor verification – **Hard token +1bio + 1mf**

Table 1: Multifactor Authentication Identity Assurance

Method	Comment - Strength	Id Assurance
1. AUTHN Hard	Standard ELS –	0.80
2. ATHN Soft	Closest to ELS	0.70
3. OOB	A Start - Minimal	0.25
4. OOB Bio	Solid	0.50
5. OOB Bio + 1mf.	Strong	0.80
6. OOB + 1mf	Moderate	0.60
7. OOB + 3mf	Strong	0.70
Greater than Normal ID Assurance directed by Web Application		
8. Hard token +	Very Strong	0.85
9. Hard token ++	Very Strong	0.90
10. Hard token +++	Highest Value	0.95

V. A TOKEN SERVER WITH CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY

In order to preserve the ELS paradigm, a temporary soft certificate needs to be provided and the user claims must be provided with a SAML credential through TLS. The user needs to be in the attribute system with claims for services sought.

A. Non PIV STS/CA Issued X.509

Non-PIV owners go to a special token server with certificate issuance authority (STS/CA) and provide a **proposed identity**. This may be email or full name, etc. The STS/CA calls a service that scans the Enterprise Attribute Store (EAS) and rejects any identity that it cannot find in EAS. The STS/CA then confirms that the requester is not an automated system (via Captcha, etc.). This avoids a number of threat vulnerabilities. The STS/CA then asks questions of the non-PIV user to resolve ambiguity (if present). For example, there are five Jon Smiths in the enterprise, but only one works in Finance. The STS/CA then establishes the DN. To this point, the identity is still a **proposed identity**. The STS/CA saves the DN attributes in separate temporary store and sets up a server side TLS. The next step is a requirement, and non-PIV users must maintain an OOB contact for this. This OOB (one or more) is provided to the human resources for inclusion in the user's enterprise data. The token server resolves OOB (email, phone voice, phone text, etc.) communication methods for DN. We note that OOB means not on the network, and if the enterprise desk phone is part of the enterprise network, it does not work as OOB. Anyone without at least one OOB is rejected.

At this point the token server sends a one-time token (10 minutes or less life) to the OOB and requests input. No input or improper input will be rejected. A successful exchange results in the identity moving to a **candidate identity**.

The STS/CA will attempt to identify if the user is using a managed device (looking for bio capability like face or fingerprints). The STS/CA retrieves the claims from the enterprise claims store for the established DN, presents a

choice from among the services the user has claims to, and asks for a selection. This establishes the application for later SAML transmission. The STS/CA chooses the maximum and minimum identify assurance needed for claims. The minimum identity assurance may not be achievable with the device, and a polite rejection is issued if so. Otherwise, the token server begins a multifactor verification, including biological, if applicable. Any multi-level failure leads to exit. If the multi-factor maximum achievable authentication for the identity assurance is successful, the identity becomes an **assured identity**. The STS/CA then creates and issues a temporary certificate, in the name of the **assured identity** DN, and sends this certificate and separately the private key to a specially configured application on the user's device for installation. The temporary certificate contains the identity assurance and has a life of 90 minutes or less. Comments in the temporary certificate, specify the assurance level and the method for the application's use as appropriate. The temporary certificate may be reused for the life of the certificate by selecting any application (this will go to the normal STS for claims).

When the user selects an application, the token server posts a SAML through the browser to the application. The SAML is specifically for the audience (selected application). The temporary certificate is used for authentication to the application, and all else works as with normal ELS for an application. The interaction between the STS/CA and the attribute system is shown in Figure 7.

B. PIV USAGE OF THE STS/CA

A PIV user may be redirected to the STS/CA when the identity assurance requirement for the web application exceeds 0.80. The post will include the identity assurance value of the user (0.80), the identity assurance value sought, and the audience for the multi-factor authentication. The STS will use the user's PIV to authenticate, and the STS/CA will try to increase the identity assurance to the level sought by the application using the methods shown in table 1. It will return a simple "Accomplished" or "No-Go," which is posted back to the application.




Figure 7: Partial Enterprise Attribute Ecosystem (EAE) for Non-PIV Users and Extended Identity Assurance

VI. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS

From an ELS standpoint, accommodation of non-PIV users adds the following requirements:

- Data Owners must specify the level of assurance on applications when specifying requirements for access and privilege in the enterprise service registry.
- STS/CA for non-PIV Users needs to be developed.
- An additional service must be placed in the EAE for comparison of attributes in DN retrieval.
- STS/CA must have full crypto and key management capability (generating asymmetric key pairs).
- Device software is needed to install temporary certificates on the end user device.
- The application must recognize temporary certificates generated by the STS/CA (STS/CA must be placed in the trust store).
- The application must recognize SAML certificates provided by the STS/CA.
- The application must check signatures and timestamp, but there is no need for revocation checking of the temporary certificate.

Advantages of the new additions:

- The derived process in this paper is not username/password – there are no accounts and no storage of user data.
- The process will handle retirees, contractors, and temporary employees if they are included in EAS.
- The process will handle missing or forgotten PIV cards.
- Since DN is in EAS claims are computed for each DN in the enterprise stores.
- Claims may be from Delegation (recommend non-PIV cannot delegate)
- All of the ELS software and handlers work without modification.
- The EAS has same attack surface as before.
- Temporary certificates expire out of system quickly.

However, the following disadvantages are noted:

- Only covers person entities (not for Non-Person Entities (NPE) – but an adaption may be possible for NPEs).
- New Vulnerabilities – TBD (i.e., software certificates – short duration is a mitigation).
- Manipulation of identities is possible (OOB requires the threat to have an OOB device in EAS that is really not part of the network).
- The threat's ability to initiate exchange with STS/CA (takes on all comers – reconnaissance by threat entities is facilitated under these circumstances).
- Intercept of temporary credentials (transmission is in TLS – some mitigation).
- On-device recovery of temporary credential (short duration provides mitigation).
- Credential forging (signatures and timeouts are some mitigations).
- The current identity assurance process treats all biometric identifications the same. For future versions, we may wish to distinguish between the types of biometric.
- The current identity assurance process treats all multi-factor queries as the same. For future versions, we may wish to distinguish between the types of multi-factor queries.

VII. SUMMARY

We have reviewed the identity issues in a high-assurance security system. We have also described an approach that relies on high-assurance architectures and the protection

elements they provide through PKI. The basic approach becomes compromised when identity is not verified by a strong credential for unique identification (such as holder-of-key in a PKI). The PKI usage is so fundamental to this approach that we have provided non-certificated users a way to obtain a temporary PKI certificate based on their enterprise need and the level of identity assurance needed to provide access and privilege to applications. The process is fully compatible with ELS and works as a complement to existing infrastructure. This work is part of a body of work for high-assurance enterprise computing using web services. Elements of this work are described in [12, 23-36].

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