DPR Based AES/SM4 Encryption Highly Efficient Implementation

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Abstract—This paper presents an efficient hardware implementation of Advance Encryption Standard (AES) and SM4 algorithms on Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA by exploiting the feature of dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) to optimize S-Box on composite field arithmetic (CFA). We utilize delay aware common sub-expression elimination (DACSE) scheme to reduce overall area consumption by sharing the multiplicative inverse (MI) over GF(2^8) and eliminating the redundant circuitry. Our results reveal that hardware resources i.e. slices are minimized by 21.6%, and frequency is improved by 27.9%. In addition to that efficiency of our implementation is improved by 62.70 Mbps/slices which is higher than the previously proposed design.

Index Terms—AES, SM4, Substitution Box(S-Box), DPR

I. INTRODUCTION

THE Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely used in various applications of information security as an encryption algorithm [1], [2]. SM4 is the first block cipher algorithm released by the Chinese National Cipher Management Committee Office and it is usually used in wireless security of local area network products [3]. Large number of products use these two algorithms to implement encryption of data. Most applications are using them independently; and without any optimization that leads to more on chip area consumption. Therefore, it is significant to optimize these algorithms used in the wireless sensor networks and other resource limited applications.

S-Box is a nonlinear function and the fundamental computing unit of AES and SM4, that occupies most of area and power consumption in circuits. For AES it occupies about 75% area of the round transformation [4]. Hence it is important to analyze the S-Box and optimize the logic.

The design and optimization of S-Box have been studied in detail. Shared memory scheme is used to design a reconfigurable S-Box for different cipher algorithms that provide more flexibility in [5], [6]. However, their design

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F. Z and Yasir is with the College of Electronic and Information Engineering Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 211100, China. consumes more area and reduces the performance of the circuit because of the memory. It uses the additional circuit to implement the two encryption schemes but only one algorithm can be used in one instance of time in [7]. It costs additional area and increased power consumption.

Since both of the cipher algorithm AES and SM4 are using MI as a computing unit which is the most complex function for reducing the chip area of S-Box. Our design shares the multiplicative inverse (MI) over $GF(2^8)$ based on dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) technology. In order to further improve implementation efficiency, composite field arithmetic (CFA) and delay aware common sub-expression elimination (DACSE) have been employed in our S-Box design.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the S-Box algorithm of AES and SM4. Section III describes the optimized implementation of S-Box circuit. Meanwhile, the detailed CFA, DACSE algorithm and DPR technology is discussed. Section IV shows the results and evaluation of our design along with comparison to other design schemes. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.

II. REVIEW OF S-BOX ALGORITHM

The algebraic expression of S-Box of AES and SM4 is shown as (1) respectively [8], [9].

$$\begin{cases} Z(x) = I(x) \cdot M + V \\ S(x) = I(x \cdot A + C) \cdot A + C \end{cases}$$
(1)

Where I is the multiplicative inverse (MI) over GF(2⁸) which can be reused by AES and SM4, x is the input of S-Box. M is the affine matrix and V is row vector of AES S-Box. A is the affine matrix and C is row vector of SM4 S-Box. Z(x) and S(x) are the output of S-Box of AES and SM4 respectively. M and V are shown in (2). A and C are shown in (3).

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad V = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
(3)

III. DESIGN AND OPTIMIZATION OF MI

A. Using CFA to optimize MI over $GF(2^8)$

Since the calculation of the MI over $GF(2^8)$ is very complex, we introduce CFA to reduce the hardware complexity by mapping the MI over $GF(2^8)$ into composite field $GF((2^4)^2)$. In order to achieve this transformation, we need to optimize the equation (1), that is expressed as:

$$\begin{cases} Z(\mathbf{x}) = M\left(\delta^{-1}\left(\delta X\right)^{-1}\right) + V\\ S(\mathbf{x}) = A\left(T^{-1}\left(T\left(AX + C\right)\right)^{-1}\right) + C \end{cases}$$
(4)

Where δ , T is the mapping matrix and the δ^{-1} , T^{-1} is the inverse of mapping matrix. We can calculate them using MATLAB based on the irreducible polynomials.

The structure of S-Box computing process is shown as Fig.1. The structure on the upper half of Fig.1 is for AES S-Box while bottom half shows SM4 S-Box. The MI over $GF((2^4)^2)$ in the middle is the MI which need to be optimized.

$$X \longrightarrow \delta^{\times} \longrightarrow GF((2^{4})^{2}) \longrightarrow M\delta^{-1} \times +V \longrightarrow Z$$
$$X \longrightarrow A^{\times} \longrightarrow +C \longrightarrow T \times \bigoplus GF((2^{4})^{2}) \longrightarrow AT^{-1} \times +C \longrightarrow S$$

Fig. 1. S-Box computing process

In finite field, the irreducible polynomials of $GF(2^8)$ of AES is (5). In the composite field $GF((2^4)^2)$ using (6) as irreducible polynomials internally.

$$P_{28}(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$$
(5)

$$\begin{cases} GF((2^4)^2): f_1(y) = y^2 + y + \upsilon \\ GF(2^4): f_2(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1 \end{cases}$$
(6)

Where $v = \{0010\}_2$. v is the coefficient of the GF(2²) irreducible polynomial. Modification of this polynomial affects the design the circuit. For SM4, it has a little different irreducible polynomial in finite field GF(2⁸). When it converts to composite field it still needs the irreducible polynomials (6).

Based on the first equation in (6), the MI over $GF(2^8)$ is calculated in the following expression:

$$A^{-1} = \left(A_{h}^{2} \upsilon + \left(A_{h} + A_{l}\right) A_{l}\right)^{-1} \left(A_{h} \gamma + \left(A_{h} + A_{l}\right)\right)$$
(7)
= $B_{l} + B_{h} \gamma = B$

Where A can be expressed as $A=A_h+\gamma A_l$, A_h , $A_l \in GF(2^4)$, B is the output of MI that can be expressed as $B=B_h+\gamma B_l$, B_h , $B_l \in GF(2^4)$. The main architecture of MI over $GF((2^4)^2)$ as shown in Fig.2.

The composite filed MI over $GF((2^4)^2)$ needs three multiplication, two addition, one square multiply coefficient and one multiplicative inverse. All sub-calculation are 4 bit input and 4 bit output in finite field $GF(2^4)$.



Fig. 2. MI over $GF((2^4)^2)$

Following section shows the calculation of multiplication, addition, square multiply coefficient and MI in $GF(2^4)$. a) Multiplication over $GF(2^4)$

Computing the multiplication, we assume that a and b are elements over $GF(2^4)$. They can be described as:

 $a=a_3\omega_3+a_2\omega_2+a_1\omega+a_0, b=b_3\omega_3+b_2\omega_2+b_1\omega+b_0$ (8) where {a₃, a₂, a₁, a₀, b₃, b₂, b₁, b₀} \in GF(2). So the expression of multiplication can be shown in (9) and $c = a \times b \mod(f_2(x))$.

$$c = \begin{cases} c_3 = (a_3b_1 + a_1b_3) + (a_3b_0 + a_0b_3) + (a_2b_1 + a_1b_2) + a_2b_2 \\ c_2 = (a_3b_1 + a_1b_3) + (a_2b_0 + a_0b_2) + a_2b_2 + a_1b_1 \\ c_1 = (a_3b_1 + a_1b_3) + (a_1b_0 + a_0b_1) + a_3b_3 + a_2b_2 \\ c_0 = (a_3b_2 + a_2b_3) + (a_3b_1 + a_1b_3) + a_2b_2 + a_0b_0 \end{cases}$$
(9)

As the set of equation (9) shows, the multiplication needs 25AND gates and 21 XOR gates. b) Addition over $GF(2^4)$

In finite field, the addition is just XOR of the corresponding bit so the addition of $GF(2^4)$ is relatively simple. It just needs 4 XOR gates, the expression is shown in (10).

$$d = a + b = \begin{cases} d_3 = a_3 b_3 \\ d_2 = a_2 b_2 \\ d_1 = a_1 b_1 \\ d_0 = a_0 b_0 \end{cases}$$
(10)

c) Constant Multiplied by Square over $GF(2^4)$

Based on the multiplication we calculated the square operation shown in (11).

$$h = a^{2} = \begin{cases} h_{3} = a_{2} \\ h_{2} = a_{2} + a_{1} \\ h_{1} = a_{3} + a_{2} \\ h_{0} = a_{2} + a_{0} \end{cases}$$
(11)

Because v is a constant $\{0010\}_2$. We calculate v with the square operation. And it cost nothing.

$$e = a^{2} * v = \begin{cases} e_{3} = a_{1} \\ e_{2} = a_{3} \\ e_{1} = a_{0} \\ e_{0} = a_{2} \end{cases}$$
(12)

d) Multiplicative Inverse over $GF(2^4)$

In finite field, it has $\alpha^{2^{p}-1} = 1, \alpha \in GF(2^{p})$. So in $GF(2^{4})$, the calculation of multiplicative inverse is

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 $\alpha^{-1} = \alpha^{14}$. We transfer the calculation from multiplicative inverse to multiplication. The expression is shown in (13).

$$f = a^{-1} = \begin{cases} f_3 = a_3 a_2 a_0 + a_3 a_1 a_0 + a_3 a_1 + a_2 a_0 + a_2 + a_1 \\ f_3 = a_3 a_2 a_0 + a_2 a_1 a_0 + a_2 a_0 + a_1 a_0 + a_3 + a_1 \\ f_3 = a_3 a_2 a_1 + a_3 a_1 a_0 + a_2 a_1 a_0 + a_3 a_0 + a_2 a_1 \\ &+ a_2 a_0 + a_1 \\ f_3 = a_3 a_2 a_1 + a_3 a_2 a_0 + a_3 a_1 + a_2 a_0 + a_1 + a_0 \end{cases}$$
(13)
It needs 27 AND gates and 21 XOR gates.

 TABLE I

 GATES CONSUMPTION AFTER CFA

Computing Unit	AND gate	XOR gate
Multiplication	25	21
Addition	0	4
Constant multiplied by square	0	0
MI over $GF(2^4)$	27	21
MI over $GF(2^8)$	102	92

MI over $GF(2^8)$ includes 2 addition, 3 multiplication, 1 MI over $GF(2^4)$ and 1 constant multiplied by square.

So after all the sub-calculation, we summarize the MI over $GF(2^8)$ gate consumption in TABLE I.

B. Using DACSE to optimize the MI over $GF(2^8)$

Because those multiplication and MI over $GF(2^4)$ are complex, we continue to optimize these two units based on DACSE considering the critical path delay and hardware consumption.

a) Multiplication over $GF(2^4)$ optimized by DACSE

On (8), we extract the same computing elements as shown in (14).

$$\begin{cases} R_{1} = a_{3}b_{2} + a_{2}b_{3} \\ R_{2} = a_{3}b_{1} + a_{1}b_{3} \\ R_{3} = a_{3}b_{0} + a_{0}b_{3} \\ R_{4} = a_{2}b_{1} + a_{1}b_{2} \\ R_{5} = a_{2}b_{0} + a_{0}b_{2} \end{cases} \begin{cases} r_{3} = a_{3}b_{3} \\ r_{2} = a_{2}b_{2} \\ r_{1} = a_{1}b_{1} \\ r_{0} = a_{0}b_{0} \\ R_{6} = a_{1}b_{0} + a_{0}b_{1} \end{cases}$$
(14)

So the product of a and b is shown:

$$c = a * b \mod(f_{2}(x)) = \begin{cases} c_{3} = R_{2} + R_{3} + R_{4} + r_{2} \\ c_{2} = R_{2} + R_{5} + r_{2} + r_{1} \\ c_{1} = R_{2} + R_{6} + r_{3} + r_{2} \\ c_{0} = R_{1} + R_{2} + r_{2} + r_{0} \end{cases}$$
(15)

Still we can find one computing unit expressed in (16).

$$S = R_2 + r_2 \tag{16}$$

So, after comparing and searching the final result is (17): $\begin{pmatrix} c & -S + R & +R \\ c & -S + R & +R \end{pmatrix}$

$$c = a * b \mod(f_2(\mathbf{x})) = \begin{cases} c_3 = S + R_3 + R_4 \\ c_2 = S + R_5 + r_1 \\ c_1 = S + R_6 + r_3 \\ c_0 = S + R_1 + r_0 \end{cases}$$
(17)

The overall hardware consumption of multiplication is 16 AND gates and 15 XOR gates and the critical path is $3T_{XOR}+1T_{AND}$.

b) Multiplicative inverse over $GF(2^4)$ optimized by DACSE

Same way, the common part of multiplicative inverse is shown in (18) and the final expression is (19).

$$\begin{cases} R_{1} = a_{3}a_{2} \\ R_{2} = a_{3}a_{1} \\ R_{3} = a_{3}a_{0} \\ R_{4} = a_{2}a_{1} \\ R_{5} = a_{2}b_{0} \end{cases} \begin{pmatrix} R_{7} = R_{1}a_{1} \\ R_{8} = R_{1}a_{0} \\ R_{9} = a_{3}R_{6} \\ R_{10} = a_{2}R_{6} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} S_{1} = a_{1} + R_{5} \\ S_{2} = R_{7} + S_{1} \\ S_{3} = R_{8} + S_{1} \\ S_{3} = R_{8} + S_{1} \\ R_{6} = a_{1}a_{0} \end{cases}$$
(18)
$$f = a^{-1} = \begin{cases} f_{3} = S_{2} + a_{2} + R_{1} + R_{8} \\ f_{3} = S_{2} + a_{3} + R_{5} + R_{9} \\ f_{3} = S_{1} + R_{2} + R_{3} + R_{8} + R_{9} \\ f_{3} = S_{1} + a_{0} + R_{0} + R_{7} \end{cases}$$
(19)

The overall hardware consumption of MI over $GF(2^4)$ is 10 AND gates and 16 XOR gates and the critical path is $3T_{XOR}+2T_{AND}$.

(**-**

After DACSE the gates utilization of $GF(2^8)$ is shown in Table II.

TABLE II GATES CONSUMPTION AFTER DACSE			
Computing Unit	AND gate	XOR gate	
Multiplication	25→16	21→15	
Addition	0	4	
Constant multiplied by square	0	0	
MI over $GF(2^4)$	27→10	21→16	
MI over $GF(2^8)$	102→58	92→69	

The $A \rightarrow B$ means that the number of gates decrease from A to B.

C. Using DACSE to optimize the constant matrix over $GF(2^8)$

After calculating the MI over $GF(2^8)$, we generate the mapping matrix and applied further optimizing by DACSE. The computing procedure of AES is like Fig.3.





For example, based on the irreducible polynomial of AES over GF(2⁸) shown in (5), we calculate the root β_i of P₂₈(*w*)=0. *w* is from 1 to 255, we use method of exhaustion to find β_i . Based on the equation (18), use β_i to generate the mapping matrix δ and the δ^{-1} is using $\delta^{-1}\delta=E$ to generate. The mapping matrix calculation of SM4 is same like AES.

$$\beta_{i} = \beta_{0}^{2^{\prime}}, (i = 0 \sim 7)$$

$$\delta_{i} = \left[1, \beta_{i}, \beta_{i}^{2}, \beta_{i}^{3}, \beta_{i}^{4}, \beta_{i}^{5}, \beta_{i}^{6}, \beta_{i}^{7}\right]$$
(20)

And the related matrix of AES is shown in (21), for SM4 is (22).

$$\begin{split} & \delta = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \delta^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
 (21)

Then we calculate the $M\delta^{-1}$ and AT^{-1} . This matrix multiplication has also been optimized by DACSE.

Finally, we have the gate consumption of those matrix multiplication as shown in Table III.

TABLE III	
CONSTANT MATRIX CONSUMPTION AFTER D.	ACSE

Computing Unit	AES	SM4
$\delta imes$	11	/
$M\delta^{-1} imes$	13	/
A imes	/	21
T imes	/	13
$AT^{I} imes$	/	13

The number in the table is the XOR gates number.

D. Using DPR Technology to optimize the MI over $GF(2^8)$

Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration is being used in many kind of security area [10]. Based on Fig.1, we use the optimized MI over $GF(2^8)$ as the static part which always work by AES and SM4 whenever any of the algorithms is used. The other operations of AES S-Box including mapping matrix, affine matrix and raw vector are in dynamic 1 AES. The other operations of SM4 are dynamic 2 SM4 and the structure of our design is shown in Fig.3.



Fig. 3. S-Box computing process

In this design, we let the biggest unit be the static and small circuit to be the dynamic. In this way, we do not have to use the redundancy circuit which always works on chip like [7]. Further improvement circuit area, critical path and DPR computing process is shown in Fig.4.

After all calculation, the un-optimized and optimized design are shown in Table IV. And comparing with the



Fig. 4. DPR S-Box computing process

TABLE IV
THE GATE OPTIMIZATION COMPARISON

Computing Unit	Not Optimized		Optimized	
	XOR	AND	XOR	AND
Mapping	22	0	11	0
MI over GF(2°) Manning inverse	20	92	58 13	69 0
Sum	144	92	82	69

normal design, our optimized design reduce 11XOR gate of mapping unit. Mapping inverse also reduce 7 XOR gate.

IV. IMPLEMENT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In paper [11], [3], they optimized AES S-Box and SM4 S-Box on $GF(((2^2)^2)^2)$ and implemented on Spartan-3E FPGA. In order to compare the difference, we implement their design on Vritex-7 FPGA. As the table V shows, the 2 design is being optimized. But if directly add the slices number of two design. The slices should be 46.

TABLE V The Comparison of Different Design			
Performance Parameter	Ref.[11] AES -Box	Ref.[3] SM4 S-Box	Ours
LUT6	10	10	15
LUT5	16	26	7
LUT4	12	14	16
LUT3	6	5	6
LUT2	14	10	10
LUT1	0	10	2
Critical Path	9	12	9/12
Frequency/MHz	221.3	188.8	188.8

In paper [7], it design a redundancy S-Box circuit in ASIC. Because of the redundancy, it cost more area, power and increase the path delay. We have implemented that design in FPGA to compare that design with our design. After implementation, the comparison of our S-Box design and others design is shown in Table VI.

TABLE VI

THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT DESIGN			
Performance Parameter	Ref.[7]	Ours	
Static/LUT	120	39	
Dynamic/LUT	0	12/21	
Slices	37	29	
Power/W	0.262	0.271	
Frequency/MHz	163.93	188.8	
Efficient/ (Mbps/slices)	35.44	52.1	

As the Table VI shows, paper [7]'s design cost 120 LUT, but ours only cost 39 for static and at most 21 for dynamic. And the slices are reduced by 21.6%. And the frequency is improved 27.9%.

V. CONCLUSION

S-Box is the most important and complex unit of AES and SM4 encryption algorithm[5]. It is significant to do more researches on S-Box, especially on reducing the area, improving the speed and low power. CFA and DACSE schemes remarkably reduce the implementation area of the S-Box. Beside that, a new implementation of AES and SM4 S-Box based on Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration technology of Xilinx Virtex 7 is proposed in this paper. After comparing with the other designs, our design shows area reduction of 21.6% and frequency improvement is 27.9%.

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